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ABSTRACT 
The research employs an adaptive cross-disciplinary research strategy in an industrial example to 
address port facilities’ inability to assess whether their security systems are efficient.  The research 
uses portfolio optimization to construct the optimum theoretical portfolio of security systems drawn 
from six different container port facilities owned by a major ports company.  The research builds on 
the existing literature and proposes new definitions of security, port security, port security risk and 
port security risk management.  The contribution which the research makes is in terms of modelling 
and measurement of the impact of the introduction of new port security technology, changes in 
background port security threat levels and for the planning of port security in Greenfield sites.  
Furthermore, the research is generalisable to all nodes in the supply chain and is not limited to port 
facilities alone. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The International Maritime Organisation’s International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code was introduced in the wake of the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks (Bichou, 2004; 
Price, 2004).  This has resulted in significant investment in security systems by companies in the 
supply chain (Bichou, 2004; Farrow & Shapiro, 2009) and in port facilities in particular (Dekker & 
Stevens, 2007).  According to Sheffi (2001), companies in the supply chain must determine how to 
balance the costs and benefits of security needs and how to do so in the most efficient manner.  The 
purpose of the research is to discover the efficient relationship between residual security risk and 
security investment for maritime port facilities.  No new theory is generated but the research 
undergoes an adaptive cross-disciplinary research approach to assess whether the six port facilities in 
the study have efficiently allocated their resources to tackle the threats of terrorism.  The research is 
generalizable to all nodes in the supply chain and is not limited to maritime port facilities. 
 
LIERATURE REVIEW 
Port Security 
In trying to arrive at a definition of port security it is suitable to begin with some origins of the 
term ‘security’ from the social science literature.  The definition of security is then considered in the 
context of the supply chain security literature and is subsequently refined in order to arrive at a 
suitable definition of port security.  Maslow (1942) describes security as a “feeling of safety; rare 
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feelings of threat or danger”.  Maslow (1942) includes security as a basic human need, together with 
safety, in his hierarchy of needs model.  Baldwin (2005) defines security as ‘the absence of threat’ and 
Buzan (1991, p19) includes such definitions as ‘relative freedom from harmful threats’ and ‘absence 
of threats to acquired values’.  Williams et al (2008, p258) describe how the origin of security stems 
from individual level theories in sociology and psychology.  Fischer and Green (2004, p21) state that 
security “implies a stable, relatively predictable environment in which an individual or group may 
pursue its ends without disruption or harm and without fear or disturbance or inquiry.”  Robinson’s 
(2008, p188) definition of security is that it “implies freedom from threat” and “one’s desire not 
merely to be free from threat but to feel free.” 
Combining Maslow (1942), Baldwin (2005), Buzan (1991) and Robinson (2008), security can be 
defined as the absence of and/or the perception of the absence of threat.  Thus an individual who is 
surrounded by threats but has taken steps to reduce the threats may feel secure.  Conversely, an 
individual who does not feel secure but who is not surrounded by any threats is in effect secure.  This 
concept is important because different individuals (with the appropriate security knowledge and 
experience) when questioned about the security of a port facility, may have differing views in terms of 
their own perceptions as to both the threats that the port facility faces and how effectively existing 
security measures address the threats.   
Here it is also important to distinguish between security and security measures: security measures 
are the measures (personnel, procedures and technology) required to achieve the absence of and/or the 
perception of the absence of threat.  Given that ports are considered to be nodes in a supply chain 
network (Yap & Lam, 2004), it is necessary when developing the definition of port security to 
examine the literature on supply chain security (SCS).   
Williams et al (2008, p256) state that few formal definitions can be found in the literature and 
draw their definition of SCS from Closs and McGarrell’s (2004, p8) definition of SCS management: 
“the application of policies, procedures and technology to protect supply chain assets (product, 
facilities, equipment, information and personnel) from theft, damage, or terrorism and to prevent the 
introduction of unauthorised contraband, people or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into the 
supply chain.”  Speier et al (2011) update the original Closs and McGarrell (2004) definition by 
describing SCS as entailing “the prevention of contamination, damage, or destruction of products 
and/or supply chain assets, and includes an acknowledgement that these events may occur from 
intentional and intentional disruptions.” 
Nevertheless, in pursuit of a definition of port security it would be easy simply to substitute 
‘port’ for ‘supply chain’ in the original Closs and McGarrell (2004) definition.  However, this would 
not distinguish between port security and port security management, in the way that Williams et at 
(2008) do not distinguish between SCS and SCS management.  Furthermore, this would limit the 
definition simply to the port’s assets and exclude cargoes and, specifically, the ship-port interface 
which the ISPS Code seeks to protect.  Also, the Closs and McGarrell (2004) definition is in some 
ways too specific in its reference to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction given that by naming 
threats they run the risk of excluding others such as sabotage or criminal damage arising from strikes 
and riots by locked out workers (see Miller, 1994, p452 for a fuller description of named threats to 
ports covered by marine insurance).  The ISPS Code does not single out terrorism as a threat per se 
but refers to measures which provide protection from security incidents (which include terrorism), 
while the US Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) refers specifically to the threat of 
terrorism in the maritime domain.  This is understandable given that the MTSA was drafted in the 
United States in the wake of the attacks on 9/11.  However, the MTSA focus on terrorism also 
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potentially excludes other forms of unauthorised acts such as maritime fraud, which is included in 
Regulation (EC) No. 725/2004.  Furthermore, the focus on WMD appears to be centred more on the 
United States, specifically in consideration of containerised trade (Harrald et al, 2004; Gerencser et al, 
2003).  Therefore, it would be appropriate to amend the named threats in the Closs and McGarrell 
(2004) definition to ‘unauthorised acts’, which is wider in scope.  ‘Unauthorised acts’ is chosen in 
preference to ‘illegal acts’ in order to avoid any confusion arising from differing definitions of legality 
between jurisdictions.  
The proposed definition for port security is: the absence of and/or the perception of the absence 
of threat to port facility assets, cargoes and the ship-port interface from unauthorised acts.  From this, 
it follows that port security management is: the application of measures (personnel, procedures and 
technology) to reduce the threat and/or the perception of threat to port facility assets, cargoes and the 
ship-port interface from unauthorised acts.  The choice of words is significant for while it may be 
preferable to try to eliminate threats rather than to reduce them, it will never be possible to eliminate 
all security threats absolutely (Price, 2004, p335). 
Port security risk 
As risk is present in all walks of daily life, it is logical that an extensive literature exists on the 
subject.  Whether considering individuals’ attitudes to risk and decision making under uncertainty 
(Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979), or risk as a factor in decision making (March and Shapira, 1987), 
the interpretation of risk varies from person to person.  Definitions of risk also vary according to the 
discipline in which the discussion is framed, be it operations management (Lewis, 2003); supply chain 
(Speier et al, 2011; Rao and Goldsby, 2009; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Christopher, 2005; Juttner et 
al, 2003; Zsidisin et al, 2004; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004), supply chain security (Williams et al, 2008), 
port security (Bichou, 2004, 2009; Talas and Menachof, 2009), terrorism (Sheffi, 2001; Woo, 2003; 
Raymond, 2006; Price, 2004, Willis et al, 2005; Greenberg et al, 2006), sociology and psychology 
(Heimer, 1988) or more established disciplines such as economics, finance or management (Juttner et 
al, 2003).    Rao and Goldsby (2009) present selected definitions of risk from the literature including 
from Lowrance (1980) “risk is a measure of the probability and severity of adverse effects” and Yates 
and Stone (1992) “risk is an inherently subjective construct that deals with the possibility of loss.”  
Definitions of risk relevant to this study can be found in Robinson (2008), March and Shapira 
(1987), Bedford and Cooke (2001), Markowitz (1952), Broder (2006), Greenberg et al (2006),  Price 
(2004) and Willis et al (2005).  Robinson (2008, p182) describes risk from a security perspective as 
“the probability that harm may result from a given threat.”  March and Shapira (1987, p1404) review 
managerial perspectives on risk and risk taking and define risk as “reflecting variation in the 
distribution of possible outcomes, their likelihoods and their subjective values.”   Bedford and 
Cooke’s (1996) analysis of probabilistic risk analysis describes risk as having two particular elements: 
hazard and uncertainty.  Markowitz (1952, p89) describes risk as “variance of return.”  Kleindorfer 
and Saad’s (2005, p55) second principle of risk management is “an extension of portfolio theory in 
finance, where a fundamental result is that portfolio diversification reduces the investor’s risk.”  
Broder (2006, p3) describes risk as “the uncertainty of financial loss, the variations between actual 
and expected results or the probability that a loss has occurred or will occur.”  Greenberg et al (2006, 
p143) state that terrorism risk “does not exist without existence of threat, the presence of vulnerability 
and the potential for consequences.”  Price (2004, p335) claims that ports (in the context of terrorism) 
are actually faced with uncertainty, not risk because uncertainty implies that while the range of events 
is known, the associated probabilities of each type of event are not.  To an insurance underwriter, risk 
can represent not only the vessel, aircraft or property under consideration for insurance (Broder, 2006, 
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p3) but also the product of the probability of the occurrence of an insured event and the financial 
consequences of such an event.  Willis et al (2005) describe terrorism risk as consisting of the product 
of threat, vulnerability and consequence: where threat is the probability that an attack occurs; 
vulnerability is the probability that an attack results in damage, given that an attack has occurred; and 
consequence is the expected damage, given that an attack has occurred which resulted in damage.  
Drawing on this definition and the definitions by Robinson (2008), Broder (2006) and Bedford and 
Cooke (2001), the proposed definition for port security risk is: the product of the probability of a 
threat to port facility assets, cargoes and the ship-port interface which may give rise to a loss and the 
size of the financial consequences that might follow.   
Port security threats 
The security threats that ports face include but are not limited to acts of terrorism.  While the 
focus on terrorism appears to be uppermost in the literature, there are limited references to such 
attacks being directed at port facilities.  Examples found in the literature include the incident in April 
1996 when the Tamil Tigers launched an attack on the port of Colombo and succeeded in damaging 
three vessels (Aryasinha, 2001), including one belonging to the Van Ommeren shipping line which 
was insured by the author; in 2004 Jamaat al-Tawhid attacked the Khawr Al Amaya and Al Basrah oil 
facilities in Iraq; and in the same year suicide bombers from Hamas and the al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade 
launched an attack in the Port of Ashdod (Greenberg et al, 2006).   
Prior to 9/11 the main security threats to ports were considered to be from drug smuggling and 
organised crime.  These resulted in the creation in the United States of the Business Anti-Smuggling 
Coalition (BASC), which has now been superceded by the Business Alliance for Secured Commerce, 
a security initiative initially aimed at reducing the risk of legitimate cargo being used by illegal 
organizations for the narcotics trade (Gutierrez et al, 2007).  Nevertheless, the potential for terrorist 
attacks to disrupt ports and supply chains dominates the literature post-9/11.  According to Raymond 
(2006, p242) ports are vulnerable to attack by terrorists: they are extensive in size and accessible by 
water and land.  Furthermore, their accessibility impedes the deployment of the types of security 
measures that, for example, can be more readily deployed at airports.  Bichou (2004) highlights the 
additional security threats that ports face due to their “close spatial interactions with large city-
agglomerations and seashore tourist attractions.”  According to Nincic (2005, p623), the Sri Lankan 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hizballah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, the Abu Sayyaf Group, Gama al-Islamiya, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the IRA 
are all believed to have varying levels of maritime expertise.  According to Raymond (2006, p240), 
the terrorist groups that are known to have a maritime capability include “Polisario, the Abu Sayyaf 
Group, Palestinian groups, Al Qaeda, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam.”  However, Raymond (2006, p244) points out that “in order to be considered a threat, it 
is not necessary for a terrorist group to have already carried out a maritime terrorist attack against 
shipping or port facilities.” 
Overview of the ISPS Code 
The ISPS Code was drawn up by the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee and its Maritime 
Security Working Group in little over a year following the adoption of resolution A.924(22) on the 
review of measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism which threaten the security of 
passengers and crews and the safety of ships, in November 2001 (ISPS Code, 2003, p iii.)  The ISPS 
Code was adopted on 12 December 2002 by the Conference of Contracting Governments to the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 when the existing chapter XI 
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was amended and re-identified as chapter XI-1 and a new chapter XI-2 was adopted on special 
measures to enhance maritime security.  Amendments were also made to the existing SOLAS chapter 
V.   
The ISPS Code is divided into two parts.  Part A establishes the new international framework of 
measures to enhance maritime security by introducing mandatory provisions while part B provides 
non-compulsory guidance on the procedures to be undertaken in order to comply with the provisions 
of chapter XI-2 and of Part A of the ISPS Code (Bichou, 2004.)  Certain countries, such as the 
European Union under EC Regulation 725/2004, have made compliance with part B of the ISPS Code 
mandatory through legislation (Dekker & Stevens, 2007; Anyanova, 2007). 
The objectives of the ISPS Code are to enable the prevention and detection of security threats 
within an international framework; to establish roles and responsibilities; to enable the collection and 
exchange of security information; to provide a methodology for assessing security and to ensure that 
adequate security measures are in place.  The objectives are to be achieved by the designation of 
appropriate personnel on each ship, in each port facility and in each shipping company, to prepare and 
to put into effect the approved security plans.  The ISPS Code is applicable to vessels engaged in 
international trade including passenger vessels with 12 or more berths, cargo vessels of 500 gross 
tonnes and over, mobile offshore drilling units and all port facilities serving such vessels engaged in 
international trade. 
Costs of ISPS Code Implementation 
Estimates of the costs of the implementation of the ISPS Code can be found in Bichou (2004), 
Bichou and Evans (2007), OECD (2003), Dekker and Stevens (2007) and Benamara and Asariotis 
(2007).  According to Bichou (2004), the US Coast Guard (USCG) estimated the cost implications of 
security compliance on US ports to be $1.1 billion for the first year and $656 million each year up to 
2012.  The OECD (2003) report estimated that more than $2 billion was required as an initial 
investment with 1$ billion annual expenditure for developing country ports alone.  Bichou and Evans 
(2007) report that in the UK, total initial costs for ISPS Code compliance for 430 port facilities was 
US$26 million with annual costs at US$2.5 million.  Dekker and Stevens (2007) carried out a survey 
of port facilities’ security investments in EU Member States and EEA countries.  The authors found 
that the average security investment per port facility was €464,000 and the average annual running 
cost was €234,000.   Benamara and Asariotis (2007) present the findings of the UNCTAD (2007) 
report which surveyed 55 ports in 28 countries.  They found that the average initial cost per ISPS port 
facility for ports with up to 10 port facilities was US$386,000 with annual costs of US$128,000. 
Port Security Incident Costs 
Greenberg et al (2006) describe how the economic consequences of a successful terrorist attack 
are likely to be large and widespread and that economic consequences of attacks on the container 
shipping system would have direct and indirect effects.  The authors describe the direct effects as life 
and injury compensation, repair and replacement of port infrastructure and other public property, 
losses of cargo and damaged and destroyed private property.  The indirect effects are a consequence 
of the role of the port in the supply chain: business interruption due to delayed or missing shipments, 
long term adjustments to the modified transport system, augmented security procedures and lost 
revenue to the port facility and to the public purse. 
The OECD report (2003, p.19) describes how, after the attack on the tanker Limburg off Aden in 
November 2002, Yemeni terminals saw container throughput plummet from 43,000 TEU in 
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September 2002 to 3,000 TEU in November 2002. This resulted largely from marine war 
underwriters’ increased war additional premiums rising to as much as USD 300,000 per vessel call.  
The Yemeni government estimated that 3,000 workers were laid off and economic losses arising from 
the attack were running at USD 15,000,000 per month. The OECD Report (2003, p.20) also states that 
property damage from a terrorist attack to a modern 16 hectare container terminal could be as much as 
USD 32,000,000.  In a wider view, Farrow and Shapiro (2009) review the literature on the cost of 
potential terrorist attacks in the United States.  They present estimates for the overall costs of various 
attack scenarios, some of which are based in ports. 
Benefit Cost Analysis in Security 
Farrow and Shapiro (2009) summarize a benefit-cost framework for investing in security. They 
also refer to a model developed by ‘Risk Management Solutions’, a private company, for insurance 
companies to use to estimate the risk of terrorist attacks.  Willis and LaTourette (2008) describe a 
probabilistic risk modelling approach in break-even benefit-cost analysis which employs the Risk 
Management Solutions methodology.  They describe terrorism risk in terms of the annual expected 
loss from damage caused by terrorist attacks where the expected loss combines the probability that the 
attack will occur and the consequence of the attacks.  The authors also state that the benefit of a 
security regulation can be expressed in terms of the reduction in the expected loss of damage and that 
a regulation is justified if the incremental cost of implementing the regulation is exceeded by the 
incremental benefit generated by the regulation.  Pinto and Talley (2006) propose a framework for 
calculating the risk-based return on investment (RROI) for a port’s security systems based on the 
framework developed by Arora et al (2004, p35) which “uses a risk management approach that 
integrates risk profile with actual damages and implementation costs to determine the costs and 
benefits of information security solutions.”  On a wider scale, Chopra and Sodhi (2004) describe the 
challenges that companies face to mitigate supply chain risks without eroding profits.  The manager’s 
role is similar to that of a stock portfolio manager: achieve the highest possible profits for varying 
levels of risk, and do so efficiently.  
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research is set in an industry example and follows a cross-disciplinary research approach.   
The objective behind the research is not the generation of new theory about port security efficiency 
but is aimed at addressing some of the problems faced by port security managers today through the 
cross-disciplinary application of portfolio optimization in the field of port security.  The research 
follows a mixed methods approach of survey questionnaires and structured interviews to collect 
largely qualitative data about the performance of the port facilities’ security systems and the risks that 
they face.  However, in this research the risks are limited strictly to terrorism owing to the limitations 
of the data available.   
 
Epistemological and Ontological Considerations 
The epistemology in this research is interpretivist-phenomenological (Bryman, 2004) given the 
researcher’s role to see the World View of the company security officers and to interpret it from their 
perspective.  Furthermore, as much of the data on the performance of port security systems is 
subjective in nature and cannot be easily measured with any physical gauge, and nor can the 
7 
 
perception of security be discerned by the ‘effect’ of the security measures alone, then the research 
can follow neither a positivist nor a realist epistemology.  The nature of port security also guides the 
ontological considerations.  Given that the perceptions of security threats are an interpretation of 
social phenomena and thus necessarily dependent on social actors, the ontology is therefore 
constructionist (Bryman, 2004).  
Research Question 
The main research question is: how can the efficient relationship between residual security risk 
and security investment be calculated for an ISPS Code compliant port facility.  Assuming that the 
port facilities in question are ISPS Code compliant, the calculation of the relationship between 
residual security risk and security investment requires the posing of a further five questions, as set out 
below. 
1. What are the security threats to the port facility and what are their probabilities? 
The research concentrates on seven different types of security incident selected from examples in 
Pinto and Talley (2006), Parfomak and Fritelli (2007) and from discussions with an international ports 
company.  The types of security incident are: bomb introduced by person on foot; car bomb; truck 
bomb; biological agent attack on the port facility – on foot; biological agent attack on the port facility 
– by vehicle; mining of port infrastructure; and vessel attacked by suicide boat.  The security 
scenarios for each port facility were presented to a Lloyd’s terrorism underwriter for his pure 
premium rating in an interview at his desk in the underwriting room in Lloyd’s of London. Bigün 
(1995) relies on expert judgements in her empirical study of risk analysis of major civil aircraft 
accidents to predict future risks. The methodology which the underwriter applies for pricing a 
terrorism risk in a given country is as follows.  He refers to his “notional base rate” for a terrorism 
risk.  He then examines the Exclusive Analysis risk score for terrorism for the country in question 
which is represented as a number between 1 and 10 to one decimal place.  This scale he has 
interpreted as a logarithmic scale of base 2.  In order to arrive at his country rate for a particular 
terrorism risk he multiplies his base rate by 2 to the power of the Exclusive Analysis risk score minus 
1.  He then makes a further subjective adjustment depending on the nature of the business of the 
proposed assured.  The underwriter’s methodology subsequently yields a single country rate for a 
terrorism risk in a specific business sector.  However, his methodology is unable to distinguish 
between two different locations in the same country and nor will it distinguish between different types 
of terrorism attack modus operandi.  While authors such as Bier et al (1999) and Lambert et al (1994) 
question the ability to forecast low probability, high impact events where there is a lack of empirical 
evidence; and Lichtenstein et al (1978) point to the biases that affect individuals’ tendency to 
overestimate low probabilities of fatal events, in this research the underwriter in question is using a 
combination of empirical data and expert knowledge in his subjective assessments. 
2. What are the estimated gross losses to the port facility following each prescribed security 
threat?  The data source for the estimates of potential economic damage to the port facilities following 
the prescribed security incidents listed above was obtained from the schedule of insurances of the 
facilities owned by global ports company.   
3. What do the security systems consist of in each port facility?  The security systems have been 
classified as access control, biometrics and detection, which in turn consist of individual security 
components.  The access control systems include all the physical gates, fencing and security personnel 
engaged in access control procedures.  The biometric systems, also described as ‘enhanced access 
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control systems’ range from pass cards to fingerprint scanning.  The detection systems include CCTV 
systems, automatic intruder alerts, radar, sonar and also the security personnel involved in security 
patrols.  The security components in the port facility were identified through the use of a survey 
questionnaire completed by each of the port facilities’ Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO).  The 
questionnaire was compiled following a line-by-line analysis of the port security equipment and 
components mandated by the ISPS Code.  The data sources for the completed survey questionnaires 
are the Port Facility Security Officers in the six port facilities.   
4. How well do the port security systems perform in the face of the prescribed security threats? 
The performance of the individual security systems can be assessed based on a series of key 
performance indicators (KPIs) that the port facility security officers (PFSOs) report monthly to the 
company security officers (CSOs).  They report, among other measures, the number of security non-
conformities for each security system.  This means that the CSOs are able to build a picture over time 
of how effectively the security systems are operating in the port facilities for which they have 
responsibility.  In a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with the CSOs, they were asked to 
interpret and translate the KPI data into percentage performance measures for each of the three main 
security systems: access control, biometrics and detection for each of the port facilities.     
5. What are the port security systems’ costs? 
The survey questionnaire also captured details of the investment of each port facility’s security 
systems and their components.  The data captured includes both the cost of the security infrastructure 
from 2004 to 2007 and the running costs of the port facility’s security systems for the 2007 year.  The 
term ‘security investment’ in this research combines both the cost of the security infrastructure from 
2004 to 2007 and the running costs for the 2007 year.   
Constructing the Port Security Risk Model 
The port security risk model is based on Willis et al (2005).   
Willis et al (2005) describe terrorist risk as “the expected consequence of an existent threat, which, for 
a given target, attack mode and damage type can be expressed as: 
Risk = P (attack occurs)  * P (attack results in damage | attack occurs)  * E (damage | attack occurs 
and results in damage)  = Threat * Vulnerability * Consequence” 
Willis et al (2005) also state that if terrorist risks are independent, expected damages of a specific type 
can be aggregated by summing across threat types and target types.  If jl is the loss (consequence) 
from an attack type j and the probability of the occurrence of jl is )( jlp and the vulnerability of the 
port facility from jl  is defined as )(1 ijsp− where ijs is the ability of security system i to prevent 
jl , then it follows that the aggregate port security risk is jijj
n
i
m
j
lsplp ×−×∑∑
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for n security systems against m different types of security incident. 
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RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Table 1 contains the estimates of physical damage, business interruption and the expected gross 
loss (in US dollars) to the six port facilities in the research following the seven prescribed security 
incidents.  The table includes the company security officer’s assessment of expected loss and the 
underwriter’s assessment of the probability of the occurrence of each prescribed security incident.  
The expected loss of each security incident is calculated as the product of the sum of the physical 
damage and business interruption amounts and the probability of occurrence.    
Table 2 shows the company security officers’ subjective assessment of the performance of the 
port facilities’ security.   The best performing port facility for access control is port facility B with a 
mean of 76.43% and with a standard deviation (s.d.) of 18.42% followed closely by port facility A 
with mean of 72.86% and s.d. of 15.77% respectively.  However, port facility B’s access control 
system cost $715,000 whereas port facility A’s is only $187,826.  The worst performing access 
control system belongs to port facility D with a mean of 22.86% and a s.d. of 7.56%. 
In terms of biometrics, port facility F was the best performing with a mean of 67.86% and a s.d. 
of 46.36% followed closely by both port facility C (mean 66.43% & s.d. of 45.43%) and port facility 
B (mean 65.71% and s.d. of 45.04%).  However, the cost of the biometrics systems varies 
considerably.  The worst performing port facility for biometrics was port facility D with a mean of 
34.29% and a s.d. of 15.12%. 
In terms of detection, port facility B was the best performing with a mean of 87.86% and a s.d. of 
7.56%.  The detection systems in port facility E were worst with a mean of only 10.00% and a s.d. of 
19.15%.  What is of interest is the size of the difference in the performance of the detection systems in 
port facility F where the mean is 41.43% and the s.d. is 40.18% compared to port facility B given that 
the size of the investment in both port facilities’ detection systems are quite similar. 
 
 
Table 1: Estimates of physical damage (PD), business interruption (BI) and gross expected loss. 
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PD 5,375,000   36,769,695 125,012,575 16,902,973   87,432,657   56,000,000   113,242,880 440,735,780    0.522% 2,300,641 
BI 10,000,000 45,000,000 92,122,118   102,122,118 122,122,118 92,122,118   122,122,118 585,610,590    0.522% 3,056,887 
Total 15,375,000 81,769,695 217,134,693 119,025,091 209,554,775 148,122,118 235,364,998 1,026,346,370 5,357,528 
PD 5,375,000   36,769,695 125,012,575 11,744,695   92,472,157   113,242,880 113,242,880 497,859,882    0.0152% 75,675      
BI 10,000,000 45,000,000 92,122,118   97,122,118   132,122,118 92,122,118   92,122,118   560,610,590    0.0152% 85,213      
Total 15,375,000 81,769,695 217,134,693 108,866,813 224,594,275 205,364,998 205,364,998 1,058,470,472 160,888    
PD 5,375,000   36,769,695 176,226,244 11,744,695   124,126,575 164,456,549 164,456,549 683,155,306    0.018% 122,968    
BI 10,000,000 45,000,000 92,122,118   97,122,118   132,122,118 92,122,118   92,122,118   560,610,590    0.018% 100,910    
Total 15,375,000 81,769,695 268,348,362 108,866,813 256,248,693 256,578,667 256,578,667 1,243,765,896 223,878    
PD 5,375,000   36,769,695 133,092,200 11,744,695   94,032,032   121,322,505 121,322,505 523,658,633    0.070% 366,561    
BI 10,000,000 45,000,000 92,122,118   97,122,118   132,122,118 92,122,118   92,122,118   560,610,590    0.070% 392,427    
Total 15,375,000 81,769,695 225,214,318 108,866,813 226,154,150 213,444,623 213,444,623 1,084,269,223 758,988    
PD 5,375,000   36,769,695 211,302,016 11,744,695   163,548,848 199,532,321 199,532,321 827,804,897    0.030% 248,341    
BI 10,000,000 45,000,000 92,122,118   97,122,118   132,122,118 92,122,118   92,122,118   560,610,590    0.030% 168,183    
Total 15,375,000 81,769,695 303,424,134 108,866,813 295,670,966 291,654,439 291,654,439 1,388,415,487 416,525    
PD 5,375,000   36,769,695 157,352,430 11,744,695   109,599,262 145,582,735 145,582,735 612,006,553    0.023% 140,762    
BI 10,000,000 45,000,000 92,122,118   97,122,118   132,122,118 92,122,118   92,122,118   560,610,590    0.023% 128,940    
Total 15,375,000 81,769,695 249,474,548 108,866,813 241,721,380 237,704,853 237,704,853 1,172,617,143 269,702    
E
F
A
B
C
D
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Table 2: Port facilities’ security systems’ performances 
 
Residual Risk and Security Cost Calculations 
Table 3 shows the calculation of the port facilities’ residual risks following the application of the 
three types of security systems and includes the costs of the security systems in US dollars.  These are 
important results in the research because for each of the port facilities A to F, there exists a calculation 
of the residual risk for each of the three security systems and an accompanying security investment. 
These combinations of performance in reducing residual risk and security investment are key to the 
portfolio optimization exercise below. 
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RR       520,227        798,016         594,387       1,912,629  
SC       187,826         33,637         261,999         483,462  
B 
RR        15,356         24,120             8,022           47,499  
SC       715,000           8,000       2,756,325       3,479,325  
C RR        37,738         33,354           42,926         114,018  SC       412,734           2,680           51,538         466,952  
D 
RR       192,436        171,719         211,518         575,673  
SC       829,730         12,200         787,670       1,629,600  
E 
RR        64,276         74,433         118,426         257,135  
SC       207,000         84,000         453,000         744,000  
F 
RR        57,829         39,121           58,589         155,539  
SC    1,324,312        275,600         349,777       1,949,689  
Table 3: Port facilities’ residual risk and security cost calculations 
Port Facilities' Security Systems' Performances
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Access Control 80% 80% 85% 80% 85% 50% 50% 72.86% 15.77%
Biometrics 90% 90% 85% 90% 90% 0% 0% 63.57% 43.47%
Detection 75% 75% 80% 75% 75% 50% 50% 68.57% 12.82%
Access Control 90% 90% 80% 90% 85% 50% 50% 76.43% 18.42%
Biometrics 95% 95% 85% 95% 90% 0% 0% 65.71% 45.04%
Detection 95% 95% 80% 95% 90% 80% 80% 87.86% 7.56%
Access Control 80% 85% 85% 80% 85% 0% 0% 59.29% 40.56%
Biometrics 90% 95% 95% 90% 95% 0% 0% 66.43% 45.43%
Detection 70% 75% 70% 70% 75% 0% 0% 51.43% 35.20%
Access Control 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 40% 22.86% 7.56%
Biometrics 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 0% 34.29% 15.12%
Detection 40% 0% 0% 40% 0% 40% 20% 20.00% 20.00%
Access Control 60% 90% 90% 60% 90% 10% 10% 58.57% 35.79%
Biometrics 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 0% 0% 57.14% 39.04%
Detection 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 20% 10.00% 19.15%
Access Control 90% 90% 90% 10% 10% 0% 30% 45.71% 42.37%
Biometrics 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 0% 0% 67.86% 46.36%
Detection 80% 0% 0% 80% 0% 80% 50% 41.43% 40.18%
A
B
C
D
E
F
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Port Security Benefit-Cost Ratios 
The findings also showed some interesting results concerning the port facilities’ security benefit-
cost ratios which show by how much each port facility’s residual security risk is reduced for every $1 
spent on security. While most of the ratios range from 0.0325 for port facility B to 0.235 for port 
facility C, the corresponding figure for port facility A is 7.13.  It is possible that the size of this figure 
may reflect the higher level of terrorist threat that exists in that country.  However, the figure for Port 
facility D is lower than for Port facility C where the terrorist threat is lower so it would be premature 
to try to draw such a conclusion.  The figures for the security benefit-cost ratios are shown in table 4. 
Port Facility Security Performance 
Ratio 
A 7.125 
B 0.033 
C 0.235 
D 0.112 
E 0.214 
F 0.032 
Table 4 – port security benefit-cost ratios 
Residual Risk / Expected Loss Ratios 
An analysis of the ratios for residual risk : expected loss per type of prescribed security incident 
show which of the port facilities are best placed to prevent such an attack.  These are shown in table 5.   
 
Table 5: Port Facilities’ Residual Risk : Expected Loss Ratios by per type of Security Incident 
For the bomb introduced by person on foot, the best performing port facility is port facility B at 
6.7% while the worst performing is port facility D at 66.7%.  This means that for a given attempt on 
port facility B, only 6.7% are expected to be successful whereas in port facility D, two thirds of 
attempted attacks are expected to be successful.  For the car bomb, port facility B again scores the 
highest with 6.7% and port facility D is again the worst performing with only a fifth of attempted 
attacks being thwarted.  For the truck bomb scenario, it is port facility A and port facility C that 
perform equal best at 16.7% and port facility D is again the worst performer at 80%.  In the case of 
the biological agent attack on the port facilities either by on foot or by vehicle, port facility B is again 
the best performing with port facility D the worst performing.  However, for both the mining of the 
port infrastructure and the vessel attacked by a suicide boat, while port facility B is again the best 
performing, the worst performing being port facility C, which was judged to be unable to prevent any 
kind of attack from the water.  This highlights that while port facility C is relatively good at 
preventing attacks that have their origins on the land, the port facility is very vulnerable to any 
waterborne threats.   
  
A 18.30% 18.30% 16.70% 18.30% 16.70% 66.70% 66.70%
B 6.70% 6.70% 18.30% 6.70% 11.70% 56.70% 56.70%
C 20.00% 15.00% 16.70% 20.00% 15.00% 100.00% 100.00%
D 66.70% 80.00% 80.00% 66.70% 80.00% 66.70% 80.00%
E 53.30% 43.30% 43.30% 53.30% 43.30% 80.00% 90.00%
F 11.70% 38.30% 38.30% 38.30% 65.00% 73.30% 73.30%
Bomb 
introduced by 
person on foot
Car 
Bomb
Truck 
bomb
Biological agent 
attack on terminal 
- on foot
Biological agent 
attack on terminal 
- by vehicle
Mining of 
port 
infrastructure
Vessel 
attacked by a 
suicide boat
Port Facility
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PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION 
The portfolio optimization resulted in an examination of all 216 (6³) possible portfolios 
constructed from the 3 security systems in each of the 6 port facilities.  The portfolios were analysed 
in terms of their security investment and their residual security risk.  The 216 possible portfolios were 
then plotted on a figure and the figures are reproduced for each of the six port facilities (see appendix 
A figures 1 to 6 for port facilities A to F respectively).  In the analysis, the possible portfolio 
combinations of the six port facilities’ security systems which best result in both a reduction in 
residual security risk and security investment were selected and these are set out in tables 6 for port 
facilities A to F respectively, below.  
 
Port 
Facility 
Port Facility’s 
Security 
System 
Portfolio 
no. 
Security 
Cost 
Security 
Cost 
Reduction 
Residual 
Risk 
Residual 
Risk 
Reduction AC BIO DET 
A A C A 13 452,505 30,957 1,849,503 63,136 
         
B 
A C B 14 2,946,831 532,494 46,638 861 
B C B 50 3,474,005 5,320 46,144 1,355 
         
C 
A C A 13 452,505 14,447 81,491 32,527 
A C C 15 242,044 224,908 98,869 15,149 
         
D 
B F A 67 1,252,599 377,001 265,836 309,837 
A C C 15 242,044 1,387,556 325,974 249,700 
         
E 
A F A 31 725,425 18,575 152,405 104,730 
A C C 15 242,044 501,956 185,847 71,288 
         
F 
B F A 67 1,252,599 697,090 96,160 59,379 
A C C 15 242,044 1,707,645 117,872 37,666 
         
 
     
      
Table 6 - Optimal Security System Portfolios for the Port Facilities A to F 
 
Port facility A has a security investment of $483,462 and a residual risk of $1,912,629.  
Following the portfolio analysis there exists only portfolio no.13 which results in both a reduced 
residual risk and a reduction in security investment.  This can be achieved by maintaining the existing 
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access control (AC) and detection (DET) systems in port facility A but substituting the existing 
biometrics (BIO) system for the system used in port facility C.   
Port facility B has a security investment of $3,479,325 and a residual risk of $47,499.  The 
portfolio which minimises the residual risk is portfolio no.50, which consists of the access control and 
detection systems from port facility B and the biometrics system from port facility C.  The portfolio 
which minimises the security investment is no.14 which consists of the access control system from 
port facility A, the biometrics system from port facility C and the detection system from port facility 
B.   
Port facility C has a security investment of $466,952 and a residual risk of $114,018.  The 
optimum portfolio for residual risk reduction is portfolio no.13, which represents the access control 
system from port facility A, the biometrics system from port facility C and the detection system from 
port facility A.  The optimum portfolio for reduction in security investment is portfolio no.15, which 
represents the access control system from port facility A and both the biometrics and the detection 
system from port facility C.   
Port facility D has a security investment of $1,629,600 and a residual risk of $575,673.   The 
portfolio which provides the greatest reduction in residual security risk is portfolio no.67, which 
combines the access control system from port facility B, the biometrics system from port facility F 
and the detection system from port facility A.  The portfolio which yields the greatest saving in 
security investment is portfolio no.15, which consists of the access control system from port facility A 
and the biometrics and detection systems from port facility C.   
Port facility E has a security investment of $744,000 and a residual risk of $257,135.  The 
optimum portfolio for reduction of residual risk is portfolio no.31 which consists of the access control 
system from port facility A, the biometrics system from port facility F and the detection system from 
port facility A.  The optimum portfolio for reduction of security cost is portfolio no.15 which consists 
of the access control system from port facility A and both the biometrics and detection systems from 
port facility C.   
Port facility F has a security investment of $1,949,689 and a residual risk of $155,539.  The 
optimum portfolio for reduction of residual risk is portfolio no.67 which consists of the access control 
system from port facility B, the biometrics system from port facility F and the detection system from 
port facility A.  As for port facility E above, the top performing portfolio for reduction in security 
investment is portfolio no.15 which consists of the access control system from port facility A and both 
the biometrics and detection systems from port facility C.   
 
Results of the Portfolio Optimization 
The portfolio optimization has produced some interesting results.  The results are presented in 
two parts: first, the optimum and alternative portfolios which are most successful in reducing residual 
security risk; and secondly, the optimum and alternative portfolios which are most successful in 
reducing the security investment.   
Reducing Residual Security Risk 
The optimum portfolio for minimising the residual risk for both port facility A and port facility C is 
portfolio no.13, which consists of access control from port facility A, biometrics from port facility C 
and detection system from port facility A.  The optimum portfolio for minimising the residual risk in 
both port facility D and port facility F is portfolio no.67, which consists of access control from port 
facility B, biometrics from port facility F and detection from port facility A.  The optimum portfolios 
for minimising the residual risk in port facility B and port facility E are portfolio numbers 50 and 31 
respectively.   
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Overall, the security systems which make up the optimum portfolios for the reduction of residual risk 
across all of the port facilities consist of the following (in various combinations): 
- Access control from either port facility A or port facility B  
- Biometrics from either port facility C or port facility F  
- Detection from either port facility A or port facility B  
  
Reducing Security Investment 
The optimum portfolio for minimising the security investment for port facility C, port facility D, 
port facility E and port facility F is portfolio no.15, which consists of access control from port facility 
A and biometrics and detection from port facility C.  It is particularly interesting that one optimum 
portfolio of security systems is so dominant in minimising security investment.  The portfolio for 
minimising the security investment in port facility A is portfolio no.13; and the corresponding 
portfolio for port facility B is no.14, which consists of access control from port facility A, biometrics 
from port facility C and detection from port facility B.  Overall, the security systems which make up 
the best performing portfolios for the reduction of security investment across all of the port facilities 
consist of the following (in various combinations): 
- Access control from port facility A 
- Biometrics from port facility C 
- Detection from port facility A, port facility B or port facility C 
 
 
Explanation for Clustering Effect 
An explanation is offered for the clustering effect highlighted by the portfolio optimization.  The clear 
division in the figures for the security investment between the two clusters makes the process 
relatively straightforward.   The left hand cluster in figures 1 to 6 ends where the security investment 
is $2,387,582 (in portfolio no. 14) and the right hand cluster begins where the security investment is 
$2,946,811 (in portfolio #214).   An examination of the portfolios where the security investment is 
$2,946,811 or greater yielded one common denominator: the inclusion in every alternative portfolio in 
the right hand cluster of the detection system from port facility B.  However, in order to be able to 
prove conclusively that this security system is responsible for the clustering, an analysis was 
conducted of the other 180 alternative portfolios and none were found to contain the same security 
system.  It is therefore shown that the clustering effect is entirely down to the inclusion in the 
alternative portfolios of the detection system from port facility B.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
The nature of the research enables direct comparisons to be made between the security systems in 
the port facilities.  Tables 2 and 3 allow for the comparison between the port facilities as to how the 
security systems perform, how they reduce risk and their costs.  This is useful for a CSO to 
understand better where the strengths and weaknesses in the port facilities’ security systems lie.  The 
benefit-cost ratios in table 4 enable a CSO to compare how much the residual risk is reduced in the 
port facilities given the security investment across different port facilities.  This ratio can be used to 
model by how much the residual risk might reduce given the introduction of new technology.  The 
residual risk : expected loss ratios in table 5 allow a comparison of how well the port facilities’ overall 
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security systems perform in the face of the prescribed security threats.  It is from this table that a CSO 
can draw some conclusions regarding how secure the port facilities are: the lower the ratio, the higher 
the level of security.       
The portfolio optimization exercise highlighted two key elements.  First, the efficient relationship 
between port security residual risk and security investment as described in figures 1 to 6 for port 
facilities A to F respectively in appendix A: the points closest to the x- and y-axes describe the 
efficient frontier.  Secondly, for each actual port security portfolio, alternative portfolios were 
discovered which both reduced cost and residual risk.  This was done by selecting better performing 
security systems from the other port facilities and combining them in theoretical portfolios, in much 
the way that one might construct a fantasy football team.  The resulting reductions in security 
investment and residual risk were calculated and shown in tables 6 to 11.    
 
 
Linking the results to the literature 
 
The figures for security investment for port facilities A, C and E are comparable with the average 
security investments in Dekker and Stevens (2007) and Benamara and Asariotis (2007).  The figures 
for the security incident costs provided by the CSO are also comparable with the OECD (2003) report.  
The security benefit-cost ratios in table 4 show that the Willis and LaTourette (2008) principle of a 
justified security regulation is upheld only in the case of port facility A where $1 of investment in 
security results in a $7.13 reduction in residual security risk.  In the other five cases, the security 
performance ratios are well below 1 and in the case of Port facility B it is particularly low at 0.0325.  
This suggests that the ISPS Code would not qualify as a justified regulation in the sense that Willis 
and LaTourette (2008) intended.   
 
Contribution 
The contribution of the research is threefold.  First, the methods can be employed in the 
development of Greenfield sites to guide a CSO to implement a security system which best suits 
his/her requirements in terms of both residual security risk and security investment and to do so 
efficiently.  Secondly, the proposed introduction of new port security technology with an enhanced 
performance in an existing port facility can be modelled to learn the extent to which the residual 
security risk might be reduced, for a new given level of security investment.  Thirdly, a change in the 
background security threat to a port facility can be quantified in terms of a change to the residual 
security risk.  CSOs can use this information to help them decide on a possible course of action to 
address the change in threat.   
Areas of Further Research 
One area for further research would be to collect empirical data on the change in performance of 
a port facility’s security systems through the introduction of new technology or working practices.  
Another area for further research would be the application of the theory in the selection of a new 
security system for a Greenfield site.  Consideration could be given to wider environmental, network-
related and organisational risk sources for future research of this nature (see Juttner et al, 2003, for a 
discussion of supply chain risk sources).   
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CONCLUSION 
The research has focussed on the field of port security and was based on an industry example.  
The existing literature has been examined and new definitions of security, port security, port security 
risk and port security risk management have been proposed.  Furthermore, a model of port security 
risk has been developed, based on Willis et al’s (2005) definition of terrorist risk. 
The main research question considered how ISPS Code compliant port facilities can discover the 
efficient relationship between residual security risk and security investment.  In order to address the 
main research question, it was broken down into two further research questions which addressed what 
it means for a port facility to be ISPS Code compliant and how the efficient relationship between 
residual security risk and security investment can be calculated.  The latter was tackled by means of 
asking a further five questions concerning security threats to port facilities; estimated gross losses to 
the port facilities following prescribed security threats; the security systems present in the port 
facilities; the performance of the security systems in the face of the prescribed security threats; and 
the security systems’ costs.  The research methodology employed mixed methods, which included 
survey questionnaires to assess the six port facilities’ security systems and costs; structured interviews 
with two of the company security officers for their subjective evaluations of the performance of the 
security systems; and an interview with a Lloyd’s Underwriter of terrorism risks.   
The research has intentionally not produced any new theory about port security but has shown 
how company security officers can assess whether a port facility’s security systems are efficient.  The 
was achieved by using portfolio optimization to construct an optimum portfolio drawn from the 
security systems in the different port facilities in order to arrive at the best solution for risk reduction 
for that port facility, in much the same way as one might construct a ‘fantasy baseball team’ drawn 
from the best players in a baseball league.  The portfolio optimization approach produced the efficient 
solution for the relationship between risk and security investment drawn from all 216 possible 
combinations of security system portfolios from among the three security systems (access control, 
biometrics and detection) across the six port facilities.   
The results of the research are generalizable to any ISPS Code compliant port facility or to any 
other type of node in the supply chain, such as a warehouse or logistics park, which consists of similar 
security systems and follows a similar security regime as that described in the ISPS Code.  
Furthermore, the research has produced two new port security ratios: the residual risk reduction : 
security expenditure ratio; and the residual risk : expected loss ratio.  These ratios can be of use to 
port security personnel and company security officers when evaluating their security systems.  The 
research contribution also includes a roadmap for developing security systems for Greenfield sites 
based on knowledge of existing security systems and the modelling of changes in background security 
risk and the introduction of new technology.   
Finally, there is scope to extend the research to include many more types of risk in order to build 
a more comprehensive model. 
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Appendix A – The graphs in figures 1 to 6 show the performances of the 216 security system portfolios in 
terms of residual security risk and security investment for Port Facilities A to F 
 
Figure 1: Optimum Portfolio Analysis: Port facility A 
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Figure 2: Optimum Portfolio Analysis: Port facility B 
 
 
Figure 3: Optimum Portfolio Analysis: Port facility C 
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Figure 4: Optimum Portfolio Analysis: Port facility D 
 
 
Figure 5: Optimum Portfolio Analysis: Port facility E 
 
 
Figure 6: Optimum Portfolio Analysis: Port facility F 
 
